The ultimate question that
has now to be considered is whether the Plaintiff should be held to be entitled
to a decree for specific performance of the agreement of 22.12.1970. The long
efflux of time (over 40 years) that has occurred and the galloping value of
real estate in the meantime are the twin inhibiting factors in this regard. The
same, however, have to be balanced with the fact that the Plaintiffs are in no
way responsible for the delay that has occurred and their keen participation in
the proceedings till date show the live interest on the part of the Plaintiffs
to have the agreement enforced in law.
The discretion to direct
specific performance of an agreement and that too after elapse of a long period
of time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and
acceptable principles. The parameters for the exercise of discretion vested by
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any
precise expression of language and the contours thereof will always depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. The ultimate guiding test would be
the principles of fairness and reasonableness as may be dictated by the
peculiar facts of any given case, which features the experienced judicial mind
can perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be emphasized that
efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a
valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance.
Efflux
of time and escalation of price of property, are to be read as a bar to the
grant of a decree of specific performance would amount to penalizing the
Plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to deny them the real fruits of a
protracted litigation wherein the issues arising are being answered in their
favour. From another perspective it may also indicate the inadequacies of the
law to deal with the long delays that, at times, occur while rendering the
final verdict in a given case. The aforesaid two features, at best, may justify
award of additional compensation to the vendor by grant of a price higher than
what had been stipulated in the agreement which price, in a given case, may
even be the market price as on date of the order of the final Court.
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Satya Jain (D) Thr. L.Rs. and Ors Vs Anis Ahmed Rushdie (D) Thr. L.Rs. and Ors.
(AIR 2013 SC 434)
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Prepared by: S. Hemanth
Advocate at Hemanth & Associates
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